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rights until the existence of the pledge is likely to become known-that is, until ap-
pointment of a receiver.
The question remains whether the bank's receiver may enforce these rights of the
depositors. Although a receiver succeeds only to the assets of the insolvent corporation
and has no greater rights than the corporation,"* there are well-recognized exceptions to
this general rule in cases of transfers in fraud of creditors and transactions held to vio-
late the "trust fund theory.""z A similar exception is required in the instant case in
order to carry out the legislative policy against pledges to secure favored depositors."
It is apparent that individual suits by the depositors of an insolvent bank cannot
achieve "uniformity in the treatment of depositors and a ratable distribution of the
assets."13 While a class suit on behalf of all depositors might achieve these objectives,
such a suit would require the appointment of a receiver to handle the distribution.
Quite obviously it is simpler to permit enforcement by the receiver.
Constitutional Law-Power of State Civil Service Commission to Exclude Pardoned
Felon from Civil Service Position-Iowa].-The plaintiff, a pardoned felon, applied
for a civil service position. The Iowa Civil Service Commission rejected the applica-
tion on the ground that Section 5701 of the Iowa Coder provides that, "in no case
shall any person be appointed or employed in .... any department which is governed
by civil service, unless such person: .... (5) Has not been convicted of a felony."
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa from a judgment of the trial court reversing
o 9 Zolman, Banks and Banking § 6291 (1936); 3 Michie, Banks and Banking § 96 (194o);
High, Receivers § 315 (z894); Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 Inl. 150, 25 N.E. 68o
(i89o); Evans v. Illinois Surety Co., 298 Ill. 101, 131 N.E. 262 (1921).
xI 9 Zolman, Banks and Banking § 6291 (1936); 3 Michie, Banks and Banking § 98 (194o);
High, Receivers § 315 (1894). In Golden v. Cervenka, 278 Ill. 409, ii6 N.E. 273 (1917), the
court held that a receiver could not enforce a cause of action belonging to the creditors indi-
vidually, since that would deprive them of a "property right," but that he could enforce a
cause of action arising from a transaction in fraud of the rights of the creditors generally.
12 Cf. Corporations-Receivers--Rights of Creditors or Receiver to Raise an Objection to
Corporate Action which Would Be Open to Shareholders, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 689-95 (I94O),
where the author points out that some courts, when confronted with an illegal depletion of
assets available for distribution to creditors, have labeled as fraud what are merely ultra vires
and illegal transactions and hence have brought such transactions within the recognized excep-
tion to the general rule. In Divide County v. Baird, 55 N.D. 45, 212 N.W. 236 (1927), involv-
ing a pledge similar to the one in the instant case, but raising no question of the statute of limi-
tations, the court permitted the receiver to recover, saying that the depositors were the vic-
tims of a "legal fraud." Ibid., at 64 and 244. The court apparently regarded as doubtful the
right of the bank itself to avoid the ultra vires pledge but held that the receiver "represents
more than the insolvent bank; he represents the creditors and general depositors of the bank.
.... The latter .... have equities which are superior to those of [the secured depositor].
..... " Ibid., at 6o and 242.
X3 People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 93, 197 N.E. 537, 545 (i935).
It is clear that the recovery of a large judgment by a single depositor or group of depositors
would nullify the effect of any relief which other depositors might subsequently be afforded.
x Iowa Code (i939) § 5701.
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the commission, held, that Subsection 5 is an unlawful invasion of the pardoning power
of the governor. Judgment affirmed. Slater v. Olson.2
The legislative history of Section 5701 indicates a purpose to insure that a man
placed on the civil service list be "a fit and proper person for the position." This broad
standard contained in the original statute3 was superseded by provisions forbidding the
employment of men who are not of good moral character (Subsection 2), who have
been convicted of felonies (Subsection 5,), who have borne arms against the government
(Subsection 6), and who have been conscientious objectors (Subsection 7). The major-
ity of the court in the instant case interpreted Subsection 5, in conjunction with Sub-
section 2, as raising a conclusive presumption of bad moral character. So construed,
Subsection 5 was held to encroach upon the governor's pardoning power. Subsection 5
may, however, be construed to be completely independent of Subsection 2 and to af-
ford a separate ground for refusing public employment regardless of the applicant's
present character. This view is supported by the coordinate positions of the two sub-
sections of the statute. Had Subsection 5 been intended merely as a qualification of
Subsection 2, it could have been properly subordinated or indeed omitted as superflu-
ous. This position is strengthened by the prohibition in Subsection 7 against employ-
ment of conscientious objectors whose moral character might be beyond reproach.
Even under this construction Subsection 5 might be held to encroach upon the gov-
ernor's pardoning power if it were applied to persons pardoned because of their in-
nocence. If the executive power to pardon for innocence is to be effective, the pardoned
person must be placed in the same position as persons who have never been convicted.
Any attempt by the legislature to attach consequences to a conviction declared void by
the executive would thus encroach upon the pardoning power. But Subsection 5 may
be construed as inapplicable to persons who have been pardoned for innocence, since
such persons have not been properly convicted. This interpretation is supported by
the analogous provision in the Iowa Code that a pardon for innocence shall preclude
the use of a prior conviction to impose a heavier sentence for a second offender under
the Hak~itual Criminal Act.4 Thus interpreted, Subsection 5 would impose upon the
Civil Service Commission the duty of ascertaining whether the applicant was pardoned
because of innocence or because the governor felt that he had been sufficiently pun-
ished. Where the pardon is ambiguous on its face, the burden of proving that the par-
don was issued for innocence would rest upon the applicant.s This burden does not
seem too severe inasmuch as the application for the pardon on grounds of innocence
would indicate the new evidence upon which the request for a pardon is based.6 If the
pardon were issued for innocence, the applicant would still be required to qualify under
Subsection 2, just as would any applicant who had never been convicted.
The question remains whether Subsection 5 is valid when applied to deny employ-
ment to felons pardoned because their punishment has been deemed sufficient. The
2299 N.W. 879 (Iowa 194).
3 Iowa L. (1921) 238.
4 Iowa Code (i939) §§ 13400, 13402.
s Under the Habitual Criminal Act-the burden is upon the convict who seeks to avoid
heavier penalties. Iowa Code (i939) § 13402.
6 If the conviction is challenged as unsupported by evidence, any insufficiency of evidence
would likewise appear in the application for pardon.
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majority of the court did not consider this precise question but approached the prob-
lem of the validity of Subsection 5, as applied to pardons generally, by defining the
scope of the pardoning power and finding that the section as construed was an en-
croachment upon it. It is suggested, however, that the inquiry should not have been
limited to the pardoning power alone, but that the proper scope of the legislative power
should also have been considered. Thus, the power of the governor to correct miscar-
riages of justice and to exercise clemency7 should have been balanced against the power
of the legislature to make provisions for the civil service and to build and preserve pub-
lic confidence in administrative officers.
Some support for the court's position is found in cases holding that pardoned per-
sons may not be subjected to any disqualifications which are not imposed upon persons
who have never been convicted,8 but these cases likewise fail to distinguish between
pardons for innocence and pardons for sufficient punishment. A larger group of cases
attempts to delineate the scope of the pardoning power with reference to the proper
scope of the legislative and the judicial power. Thus questions concerning the deporta-
tion of aliens9 have been held dearly within the legislative power and therefore unaf-
fected by a pardon. Similarly, determination of questions of disbarment,xo credibility
of witnesses,x' and the application of habitual criminal statutesu have been held within
the province of the judiciary and not affected by the exercise of the pardoning power.
The pardoning power exists as a check upon the judiciary; in exercising it, the execu-
tive performs a judicial function. The executive (except where he pardons for inno-
cence) acts only to prevent undue hardship in special cases;'3 he is not motivated by
considerations of the integrity of the bar or of the credibility of testimony. Although
there can be little doubt of the executive's legitimate interest in the maintenance of
These are the two reasons for the exercise of the pardoning power stated in Mr. Justice
Taft's opinion in Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
8 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1866); Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474 (1875);
United States ex rel, Schwartz v. Commanding Officer, 252 Fed. 314 (D.C. N.J. i918); Ex
parte Jones, 220 Pac. 978 (Okla. Crim. 1923); Stephens v. State ex rel. Goldsberry, iii Okla.
262, 239 Pac. 450 (1925); Warren v. State, 127 Tex. Crim. 71, 74 S.W. (2d) ioo6 (1934);
Sanders v. State, io8 Tex. Crim. 467, i S.W. (2d) 9oi (1928); Eighmy v. People, 78 N.Y. 330
(x879); Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, i45 Atl. 89 (1928).
9 United States ex rel. Brazier v. Com'r, 5 F. (2d) 162 (C.C.A. 2d 1924); United States ex
rel. Palermo v. Smith, 17 F. (2d) 534 (C.C.A. 2d 1927).
1o Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); People v. Gilmore, 24 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737 Uz9o5);
People v. George, 186 Ill. 122, 57 N.E. 804 (i9oo); In re O'Connell, 64 Cal. App. 673, 222 Pac.
625 (1923); In the Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, ix6 N.E. 782 (1917); see Nelson v. Common-
wealth, 128 Ky. 779, 789, 109 S.W. 337,339 (1go8).
11 Wormley v. State, 65 Tex. Crim. 48, x43 S.W. 6,5 (1912); State v. Serfling, 131 Wash.
605, 230 Pac. 847 (1924); People v. Andrae, 295 Ill. 445, 129 N.E. 178 (1920); Commonwealth
v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 Ad. 89 (1928).
12 People ex rel. Malstrom v. Kaiser, x35 Misc. 67, 236 N.Y. Supp. 6ig (S.Ct. 1929); Carlesi
v. New York, 208 N.Y. 547, ioi N.E. 1114 (1913), aff'd 233 U.S. 5I (1914); People v. Biggs,
9 Cal. (2d) 508, 7, P. (2d) 214 (i937). Contra: State v. Lee, 171 La. 744, 132 So. 219 (1931);
Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 194, 20 S.W. (2d) 416 (1929); see Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
(U.S.) 333, 380 (1866).
13 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
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public confidence in the civil service, this consideration is irrelevant to the exercise of
the pardoning power.
Furthermore, courts have recognized the broad power of the legislature to fix
the terms and conditions of public employment.4 Legislative regulation in this field
is invalidated only when arbitrary or unreasonable.'s It may be well argued that unless
a convicted person is given an opportunity upon expiration of his sentence to show im-
provement of his moral character and to regain all civil rights and privileges, no incen-
tive to moral rehabilitation remains; legislation denying the right to show good moral
character is therefore unsound. But this argument does not extend alone to recipients
of executive clemency, nor does it afford a basis for invalidating legislation which fails
to distinguish between such persons and persons who have served the full sentences im-
posed upon them.
Constitutional Law-State Statute Penalizing Bringing Non-resident Indigents
into State-[United States].-A California statute provides that any person bringing
into the state an indigent non-resident, knowing him to be indigent, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor.x In January, iQ4o, the defendant brought his brother-in-law into California
from Texas; he was convicted in a justice court of violating the statute. The superior
court affirmed the conviction, holding the statute constitutional. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, that the statute is unconstitutional as a bur-
den on interstate commerce. In a concurring opinion,2 Mr. Justice Douglas, expressing
no views on the commerce clause, urged that the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring separate-
ly, admitted that the commerce clause was applicable under the precedents but con-
tended that the decision should rest solely on the privileges and immunities clause.
Edwards v. California.3
By restricting state action burdening interstate commerce, the principal case runs
counter to a trend indicated by recent decisions in which the power of the states to un-
dertake action affecting interstate commerce has been supported.4 This trend is in
14 Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, X27-28 (1926), with United States v.
Perkins, i6 U.S. 483,484 (1886), and Butler v. White, 83 Fed. 578, 582 (C.C. W.Va. 1897).
Cf. Fire Dept. v. Gilmore, 149 N.Y. 453, 44 N.E. 177 (x896); Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189
Mass. 247, 75 N.E. 61g (I9O5); Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Atl. 743 (Md. App. 1933); Prichard v.
Battle, 17 S.E. (2d) 393 (Va. 1941).
1s Cowen v. Reary, 283 N.Y. 232, 28 N.E. (2d) 390 (194o), noted in i St. John's L. Rev. go
(1940); Fink v. Finegan, 270 N.Y. 356, 1 N.E. (2d) 462 (1936); see Powell, The Right to Work
for the State, i6 Col. L. Rev. 99 (igi6).
x Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code (Deering, 1937) § 2615. The general problem of legal
restrictions on interstate migration of indigent persons is considered in Depression Migrants
and the States, 53 Harv. L. Rev. o3i (I94O); Interstate Migration and Personal Liberty, 40
Col. L. Rev. 1032 (x94o); State Economic Protectionism and the Federal Constitution, 34 I.
L. Rev. 44, 50-52, 59-60 (1939).
2 Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Murphy concurred in the opinion of Mr. Justice Doug-
las.
3 62 S. Ct. 164 (I94i), noted in 42 Col. L. Rev. i39 (1942).
4 California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941) (upholding a state regulation of passenger
agents); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (I94O) (state regulation of motor carriers); Nelson
